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Even Before Enron: Bank Regulators, The Income Tax, The S&L Crisis, 
And Deceptive Accounting At The Supreme Court 
 
Stephen B. Cohen 
 
5 Green Bag 2d 387 (2002) 
Years before the ENRON debacle, the Supreme Court heard a pair of cases 
involving dishonest financial accounting, Frank Lyon Co. v. U.S.1 and Cottage Savings 
Ass’n. v. Commissioner.2   Both cases raised fundamental tax law issues concerning who 
really owns property and when losses are deductible.  The cases also shared a peculiar 
genesis.  In both cases, federal bank regulators had encouraged deceptive financial 
accounting in order to circumvent statutes intended to protect bank depositors, and the 
deceptive accounting became the basis for taxpayer claims.   
The Supreme Court, however, did not comment in either opinion on the deceptive 
character of the financial accounting that gave rise to tax litigation.  In one sense, this 
omission is understandable.  The Internal Revenue Service had no standing to challenge 
the decisions by the bank regulators to countenance deceptive accounting.  Thus, the 
propriety of the accounting was not a legal issue in either case.  Nevertheless, it is 
astonishing that the Court did not mention, even in passing, that the tax issues arose only 
                                      
1  435 U.S. 561 (1978). 
2  499 U.S. 554 (1991). 
2 
because bank regulators, charged with promoting fair and accurate accounting disclosure, 
violated their public trust.       
The first case, Frank Lyon, involved a transaction between the taxpayer and 
Worthen Bank, located in Little Rock, Arkansas.  Worthen had spent $10 million on a 
new headquarters building.  The bank was subject to regulation by the Federal Reserve 
System and needed Federal Reserve approval of its spending for the new building.  The 
Federal Reserve ruled that the $10 million cost exceeded statutory limits on the amount 
that a bank could spend on its premises and therefore refused to permit Worthen to 
continue to own the building.     
The Federal Reserve did, however, approve an arrangement, different in form but 
not in substance, under which Worthen could use the building without actually owning it.  
First, Worthen sold the building to Frank Lyon Co. for $7,640,000, which was 
$2,360,000 less than the building’s actual cost.  Frank Lyon financed the $7,640,000 
price with a $500,000 cash payment plus a 25-year mortgage loan from New York Life 
Insurance Co. for the $7,140,000 balance.     
Second, Frank Lyon leased the building back to Worthen for 25 years.  The lease 
was a full payout lease that would fund repayment of the mortgage; each year for 25 
years, the rent owed by Worthen to Frank Lyon equaled the mortgage payment owed by 
Frank Lyon to New York Life.  The lease was also a net lease; the lessee, Worthen, was 
responsible for all expenses of the building, including utilities, maintenance, insurance, 
property taxes, and so on.   
Third, Frank Lyon granted Worthen an option to repurchase the building during 
the 11th through 25th years of the lease.  To exercise the repurchase option, Worthen had 
3 
to pay Frank Lyon an amount equal to the $500,000 cash down payment plus 6% interest 
on that down payment compounded to the date of the option’s exercise and, in addition, 
had to assume the unpaid balance of Frank Lyon’s mortgage obligation.     
Worthen was virtually certain to exercise the option because it was “in the 
money,” that is, the exercise price was almost certain to be substantially less than the 
building’s market value.  For example, at the end of the 25th year, when the mortgage was 
fully paid off, the exercise price was $500,000 plus interest at six percent compounded 
for 25 years, or $2,150,000 total.  The building, which cost $10 million, would have to 
lose nearly eighty percent of its value before exercise of the repurchase option would no 
longer make sense.   
That Worthen expected to exercise the option is also indicated by the sales price 
to Frank Lyon, which was only $7,640,000, an amount  $2,360,000 less than the 
building’s $10 million cost.  Worthen was presumably willing to sell the building below 
cost only because it planned to recoup the $2,360,000 difference by exercising the option 
to repurchase the building in the future.3   
At this point in the narrative, it should be apparent that the economic relationships 
among Worthen, the mortgagee (N.Y. Life), and Frank Lyon were virtually identical to 
the relationships between an owner, a first mortgagee, and a second mortgagee, 
respectively.  Worthen’s investment in the leasehold and repurchase option was no 
different from that of an owner who finances the $10 million cost of a building with a 
                                      
3  As an alternative to exercising the repurchase option, Worthen could renew the lease 
for up to five additional eight-year terms.  Tthe rents specified for the eight renewal 
periods would also have provided Frank Lyon with the equivalent of $500,000 
compounded at six percent.   
4 
$2,360,000 cash down payment, a $7,140,000 first mortgage, and a $500,000 second 
mortgage.  Worthen could obtain full ownership of the building free and clear of the 
claims of others by repaying the amounts, plus interest, advanced by the other two parties 
to the transaction.  Whether Worthen formally owned the building, as it originally 
desired, or was a lessee with a repurchase option, as the Federal Reserve permitted, had 
no real impact whatsoever on the amount that Worthen actually spent on the building.       
The reader may therefore wonder what the Federal Reserve was thinking when it 
prevented Worthen from owning the building, on the grounds that ownership would 
violate statutory limits on what a bank may spend on its premises, but approved 
equivalent spending through a lease with an option to repurchase.4  It seems 
inconceivable that the Federal Reserve did not understand the financial equivalence.   
The Federal Reserve apparently wanted to permit Worthen to evade the statutory 
limits on the amount a bank can spend on its own premises.  In order to achieve this 
objective, however, the banking regulator condoned deceptive accounting.  In calculating 
how much the bank spent on its premises, the Federal Reserve counted only the cost of 
                                      
4  Two decades later, in a virtually identical transaction involving a building, the 
Comptroller of the Currency decided that it was really the lessee with the option to 
repurchase who had invested in real property.  In this transaction, a nonbanking business 
was the long-term lessee of real estate and held an option to repurchase at a bargain price, 
while the lessor (and nominal owner) was a bank.   The issue was whether the bank had 
invested in real estate in violation of federal statutory limits.  The Comptroller held that 
the bank did not really own the real estate but had simply provided financing.  Therefore, 
the arrangement did not violate statutory limits on how much a bank could spend on real 
estate.  OCC Interpretive Letter No. 806 (October 17, 1997).   
5 
real property to which the bank held legal title and excluded the cost of the leasehold 
interest and repurchase option.5     
How did this accounting subterfuge produce litigation over taxes?  Since the 
Federal Reserve considered Frank Lyon rather than Worthen to be the building’s owner, 
Frank Lyon presumed that it could claim depreciation deductions for the building on its 
tax return.  The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) challenged this claim on the ground that 
Frank Lyon was not the real owner for tax purposes.     
To the IRS, it must have seemed an easy case, with the legal precedents clearly 
supporting its position.  In similar circumstances in 1939, the Supreme Court had held 
that the lessee with an option to repurchase at a bargain price was the owner for tax 
purposes.6  The federal courts had applied this rule consistently for decades to distinguish 
between a financing party who holds formal legal title and the real owner for tax 
purposes.7  While the Federal Reserve might treat Worthen as not owning the building for 
purposes of enforcing federal limits on a bank’s investment in its premises, for purposes 
of the tax law, the building’s real owner was Worthen.   
True, Frank Lyon initially prevailed before a friendly judge in the taxpayer’s local 
Federal District Court in Little Rock, Arkansas.8  The trial court, however, based its 
                                      
5  Generally Accepted Accounting Principles require a lessee to treat a so-called “capital 
lease” as constituting ownership of the leased property.  A lease is considered a capital 
lease if the lessee has an option, as Worthen did, to purchase the leased property at a 
bargain price.  See DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATTHEW J. BARRETT, ACCOUNTING 
FOR LAWYERS, 843-45 (2001) 
 
6  Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939). 
7  See Estate of Starr v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959). 
8  36 AFTR2d 75-5254 (E.D. Ark. 1975). 
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decision for the taxpayer on an a patently false finding: that the exercise price provided in 
the option to repurchase reflected, not a bargain price, but the parties’ best estimate of the 
full fair market value of the building at the future time when the option would be 
exercised.9  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit predictably reversed.10           
Tax lawyers were therefore surprised when the Supreme Court decided that Frank 
Lyon was the real owner for tax purposes and could take depreciation deductions for the 
building.11  What might explain this unprecedented result?  The Court emphasized 
Federal Reserve approval of the transaction that designated Frank Lyon as the building’s 
owner.12  You might think of the Court’s decision as exemplifying the principle of cross-
                                      
9  435 U.S. 561, 572, n. 6. 
10  536 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 
11 See Bernard Wolfman, The Supreme Court in The Lyon’s Den: A Failure of Judicial 
Process, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 1087-88 (1981).  The taxpayer in Frank Lyon
made an inspired choice of counsel to prosecute the appeal of the unfavorable outcome in 
the Circuit Court.  The taxpayer selected a former “Tenth Justice”, Erwin Griswold, who 
had served as Solicitor General from 1967 to 1973 and, as a consequence of his former 
position, may have unduly influenced the outcome.   
12 The Court offered two other justifications for concluding that Frank Lyon was the 
owner for tax purposess and for distinguishing its earlier precedent, Helvering v. Lazarus, 
308 U.S. 252 (1939),  in which it held that a lessor in similar circumstances was not the 
real owner.  First, the Lyon Court ruled that Frank Lyon had incurred significant risks 
because it was liable for the entire $7,140,000 mortgage in the event that Worthen 
defaulted on the rent.  However, Frank Lyon’s potential liability was simply a financing 
risk, indistinguishable from the financing risk incurred by the lessor in Lazarus.  Second, 
the Court stated that the case involved a three-party transaction, in which a third party 
mortgagee provided financing for the sale of the building from the Worthen to Frank 
Lyon, whereas the Lazarus transaction, which was seller-financed, had only two parties, 
the seller and the buyer.  However, the court never explained why third-party financing 
should make a difference.  If anything, the existence of a third party meant that the lessor 
in Frank Lyon incurred even less risk than the lessor in Lazarus and therefore should 
have been even less likely to be considered the tax owner of the building.  Third-party 
financing is logically relevant only if there is a chance that the price paid for depreciable 
7 
town estoppel: a federal agency in one part of the town of Washington, D.C., namely the 
IRS, is estopped from challenging a transaction endorsed by a different federal agency in 
another part of town, the Federal Reserve.13   
The Court may also have been reluctant to create an unfair windfall for Worthen 
at Frank Lyon’s expense.  Depreciation deductions are a valuable tax benefit.  If Frank 
Lyon was not the real owner for tax purposes and could not deduct the depreciation, then 
Worthen was the real owner who could.  Yet the terms of the repurchase option – 
providing a six percent cash return on the $500,000 in financing provided by Frank Lyon 
– were negotiated with the expectation that Frank Lyon would obtain tax benefits by 
depreciating the building.14  A Supreme Court decision for the IRS therefore would 
therefore have upset the bargain reached by the parties with the Federal Reserve’s 
approval.15     
                                                                                                               
property is being inflated, a circumstance that did not arise in either Lazarus or Frank
Lyon.      
 
13 This estoppel principle supposedly protects citizens from being whipsawed between 
two different federal bureaucracies with different points of view.    
 
14 Thus, the return on the $500,000 that Frank Lyon contributed to the transaction was to 
consist of two components: cash payments from Worthen equal to 6 percent interest plus 
depreciation deductions for the building.  If Frank Lyon had thought that the depreciation 
was Worthen’s, then presumably the repurchase option would have provided for larger 
cash payments from Worthen in order to provide an adequate return on the $500,000 in 
cash that Frank Lyon advanced.    
15 The Court apparently never considered the possibility that Frank Lyon did not deserve 
sympathy or protection because Frank Lyon could and should have taken steps to protect 
its position.  Frank Lyon could, for example, have consulted tax counsel before assuming 
that it would be able to depreciate the building rather than simply relying on the fact that 
the Federal Reserve had approved the deal.  Counsel would have advised that Frank 
Lyon’s claim of depreciation deductions for the building would almost certainly be 
challenged.  Frank Lyon then could have insisted that the repurchase option provide for 
Worthen to indemnify Frank Lyon, by making an additional cash payment, in the event 
8 
The accounting deception was even more egregious in the second Supreme Court 
case, Cottage Savings. During the 1970s, the assets of Savings and Loan Associations 
(S&Ls) consisted largely of long-term, fixed interest rate home mortgages.  These assets 
plummeted in value when market interest rates rose dramatically during this period.  As a 
result, the S&L industry was in crisis, with thousands of institutions on the verge of 
bankruptcy, threatening the savings of millions of depositors.      
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) was the government agency 
responsible for supervising S&Ls.  On the advice of the FHLBB, Cottage Savings 
swapped its existing home mortgages for different mortgages with the same risk and 
expected return characteristics.  The FHLBB encouraged thousands of other S&Ls in the 
same position as Cottage Savings to engage in similar mortgage swaps in order to realize 
the losses and claim a deduction for tax purposes.  The FHLBB also ruled that losses 
from mortgage swaps – which it believed would be deductible for federal tax purposes – 
would not have to be reported for purposes of financial accounting because they effected 
no real change in the economic position of the S&Ls.   
The FHLBB’s objective in promoting the mortgage swaps was to enable S&Ls to 
deduct tax losses without recording the losses on their balance sheets.  The FHLBB 
understood that financial accounting disclosure of the losses would have revealed that 
many S&Ls were actually insolvent, and federal statutes would then have required the 
FHLBB to shut down the insolvent S&Ls.  Thus, the FHLBB, like the Federal Reserve in 
Frank Lyon, was circumventing statutory rules intended to protect the public.   
                                                                                                               
that Frank Lyon was denied depreciation deductions for the building and Worthen 
consequently received the depreciation’s tax benefits.         
9 
The FHLBB’s nondisclosure rule, moreover, was contrary to Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP), which require a loss on property to be reported no later 
than the time when the loss is realized through a sale or exchange.   When unrealized 
losses are unusually large, as in the case of S&Ls in the late 1970s, these principles 
advise (but do not require) that the losses be disclosed in order to convey an accurate 
picture of the subject’s financial position, even though the losses have not yet been 
realized through a sale or exchange.   
Given the public’s stake in knowing if a bank faces insolvency, the large losses of 
the S&Ls, whether realized or not, should have been disclosed for financial accounting 
purposes.  The FHLBB’s failure to require reporting of such unrealized losses was bad 
enough.  To authorize the nondisclosure of those losses, even when realized through a 
mortgage swap, was blatantly dishonest and helped conceal the festering savings and loan 
crisis.   
If the S&Ls had reported the losses for both financial reporting and tax purposes, 
the IRS would probably not have complained.  It was the inconsistent treatment that 
seems to have caused the IRS to challenge the deductions for losses realized when 
existing mortgages were swapped for different mortgages with the same risk and 
expected return.    
This time the legal precedents did not favor the IRS.  The tax law generally treats 
losses as deductible when realized through a sale or exchange even if the taxpayer 
acquires other property with the same economic characteristics.16  A deduction is 
                                      
10 
generally disallowed only if the taxpayer replaces the property sold or exchanged with 
virtually identical property.17  It was therefore unsurprising that the Supreme Court ruled 
for the taxpayer in Cottage Savings and held that the losses were deductible for tax 
purposes even if not disclosed for purposes of financial accounting.  The Court, however, 
once again failed to mention the deceptive character of the financial accounting that gave 
rise to the tax litigation.     
The S&L crisis had more than enough villains: bank executives who made 
imprudent loans; federal regulators who encouraged deceptive accounting; and elected 
officials who refused to act until a federal bailout of the S&L sector, costing hundreds of 
billions of dollars, became necessary.  Compared to these miscreants, the Supreme Court 
in deciding Cottage Savings was just a bystander.  Yet even a bystander has a civic (if not 
a legal) duty to report illegal behavior when he or she observes it.  So perhaps the Court 
should have mentioned the FHLBB’s dishonesty and dereliction in its opinion in Cottage
Savings, even if the mention would have been mere dictum, especially since the purpose 
of the deception was to evade statutory requirements intended to protect the public.  
We can even imagine what might have happened if the Court had criticized the 
Federal Reserve for condoning deceptive accounting in its earlier opinion in Frank Lyon.  
The FHLBB might have been less eager a few years later to encourage deceptive 
accounting that covered up the S&L crisis.  Even ENRON’s managers and accountants, 
two decades later, might not have made such egregiously false financial claims.     
                                                                                                               
16 See Smith v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 350 (1982), affirmed, 1820 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 
1988).   The exception in § 1031, providing for nonrecognition of losses on exchanges of 
properties of like kind, does not apply to mortgages. 
17 See I.R.C. § 1091(a); Horne v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 250 (1945); McWilliams v. 
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947); Smith, supra note 15.   
